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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16519 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 282, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16525 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME, LOCAL 650, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16626 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL, CLERICAL AND TECHNICAL 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16772 
BUFFALO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
Board - U-16519, U-16525, U-16626 & U-16772 -2 
W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., for Buffalo Police Benevolent 
Association and Buffalo Professional Firefighters 
Association, Local 282 
ROBERT J. REDEN, ESQ. for AFSCME, Local 650, AFL-CIO 
PAUL D. WEISS, ESQ. for Professional, Clerical and Technical 
Employees Association 
EDWARD PEACE, CORPORATION COUNSEL (JAMES L. JARVIS, JR. 
of counsel), for City of Buffalo and Buffalo City 
School District 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Buffalo (City) and the Buffalo City School District (District) 
(jointly, respondents) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) holding that §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 
Fair Employment Act (Act) was violated when a ban on smoking on 
all City property and in all City vehicles was imposed. 
In January 1995, the Buffalo City Council amended Article IV 
of Chapter 399 of the Code of the City of Buffalo, effective 
April 1, 1995, to prohibit smoking within any City building or 
any vehicle owned or leased by or to the City and imposed a fine 
of up to $500 per day for each violation.-' On March 6, 1995, 
the District's Superintendent of Schools sent a memo to all 
District staff, notifying them of the amendment to the City Code 
and its effective date. The memo went on to state: 
[A]11 employees of the [District] are effected [sic] by 
this policy even though the Board of Education will not 
-'Prior to the adoption of the amendment, smoking was permitted 
on a limited basis on property owned or leased by the City and in 
City vehicles. 
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formally adopt their policy until the April 12, 1995 
Board meeting.... However, please be advised that 
smoking is not allowed in City Hall offices effective 
immediately. Violators are subject to a fine of 
$1,000.00 per day.-7 
On March 1, 1995, the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association 
(PBA) filed an improper practice charge (U-16519) alleging that 
the City had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act by unilaterally 
banning smoking in all City buildings and vehicles, including 
police buildings, police vehicles and police property. The 
Buffalo Professional Firefighters Association, Local 282 
(Association) filed, on March 3, 1995, a charge (U-16525) 
alleging that the City had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act by 
unilaterally banning smoking in all City property, including fire 
buildings, vehicles and property. On March 31, 1995, the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 
Local 650, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) filed an improper practice charge (U-
16626) alleging that the City had violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of 
the Act by unilaterally imposing a smoking ban. The 
Professional, Clerical and Technical Employees Association 
(PCTEA) filed an improper practice charge (U-16772) on May 15, 
1995, alleging that the District had violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act by unilaterally prohibiting unit employees from smoking at 
their work stations throughout the Board of Education offices, 
which are located in City Hall. 
-'No evidence was offered to explain the discrepancy between the 
maximum amount of the fine imposed by the legislation ($500 per 
day) and the amount of the fine ($1000 per day) described in the 
Superintendent's memorandum. 
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The City did not file an answer to any of the charges 
against it. The District's answer raised the defense that such 
smoking restrictions may be unilaterally imposed pursuant to 
§1399-o of the New York Public Health Law (PHL) and Title 20 
U.S.C. §§6083 and 6084.5/ 
A stipulation of facts was prepared by the parties in lieu 
of a hearing. Thereafter, the parties submitted briefs to the 
ALJ. In addition to its claim that the unilateral imposition of 
the smoking ban was permitted by PHL §1399-o, the City alleged, 
for the first time in its brief, that the imposition of the ban 
applied to the general public, as well as City employees, and 
that it was, therefore, not mandatorily negotiable. 
Characterizing the latter defense as an affirmative defense, the 
ALJ rejected it, reasoning that an affirmative defense that is 
not raised in a timely answer is waived and may not be raised 
thereafter for the first time in a brief. Finding that the 
City's ban had exceeded the requirements of PHL §1399-o, the ALJ 
determined that the smoking ban was mandatorily negotiable-7 and 
that the City and the District had, accordingly, violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Act.^7 The ALJ ordered that the ban not be 
5/The parties later stipulated that Title 20 U.S.C. §§6083-6084 
were not relevant to the case before the ALJ. 
^State of New York (Dep't of Law^. 25 PERB f3024 (1992) ; Newark 
Vallev Cent. Sen. Dist., 24 PERB 53037 (1991), conf'd. 83 N.Y.2d 
315, 27 PERB f7002 (1994). 
-
;The ALJ dismissed the alleged violation of §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act as no facts were alleged or proven to support a finding of 
that violation. No exceptions were taken to this determination. 
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enforced as to the employees in the bargaining units represented 
by the PBA, Association, PCTEA, and AFSCME, and that the prior 
smoking practices be restored. 
The respondents except to the ALJ's decision, arguing that 
the City's defense should have been addressed on its merits and 
the charges, as a result, dismissed in their entirety. The PBA, 
the Association, AFSCME and PCTEA support the ALJ's decision. 
Our initial review of the charges and the record before us 
raised the question of whether and to what extent there exists on 
the record evidence of executive branch adoption and 
implementation of the City Code by the City and the District. We 
apprised the parties of this issue and afforded them the 
opportunity to submit supplemental briefs addressing this 
question, which was not raised before the ALJ, and whether in the 
absence of executive branch adoption and implementation, 
enactment of the City Code by the City Council sets forth a 
cognizable violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The City and 
District responded as one, arguing that the action of the City 
Council was legislative and, therefore, could not violate the 
duty to bargain, which is vested in the chief executive officer 
of a public employer.^ The Association, PBA, AFSCME and PCTEA 
responded that the record supported a finding that the smoking 
ban had been adopted and implemented by both the Mayor and the 
Superintendent of Schools. They further argued that, should we 
^See cases cited infra note 7. 
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determine that the record did not support such a finding, the 
cases ought to be remanded to the A U for further proceedings to 
allow for the introduction of additional evidence. 
Based upon a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we reverse the AKT's decision. 
The action complained of under all of these charges is 
simply and solely an amendment to the City Code passed by the 
Buffalo City Council in its capacity as a legislative body. We 
have previously held that a "legislative body's action is not 
reviewable under the refusal to negotiate provisions of the Act 
since it has neither right nor duty to bargain."-7 Here, the 
record shows only that the City Council enacted legislation about 
which the City then advised its employees.27 Had the City, as 
employer, separately adopted the terms of the legislation as work 
rules and advised its employees that, as employees, they would 
face discipline or any other employment-related consequences for 
failure to comply with the legislation then a cause of action 
under §209-a.l(d) would lie. Likewise, the District simply 
advised its employees of the City Council's enactment of the 
amendment, its effective date, and the terms and penalties of 
^Citv of Glens Falls. 24 PERB f3015, at 3030 n. 4 (1991). See 
also Odessa-Montour Cent. Sch. Dist., 27 PERB f3050 (1994), 28 
PERB f3013 (1995), rev'd. A.D. _, 29 PERB f7008 (3d Dep't 
1996); Niagara County Legislature and County of Niagara. 16 PERB 
53071, rev'd on other grounds, 17 PERB f7003 (Sup. Ct. Niagara 
Co. 1984). 
-
7The method of notification is not apparent from the stipulated 
record. 
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that legislation, with no separate employment consequence imposed 
by the District as employer.-7 As the action complained of in 
these charges is merely the legislative imposition of a smoking 
ban applicable not just to employees but to the public generally, 
without executive adoption, there can be no violation of §209-
a.l(d) of the Act, as a matter of law. As the record 
affirmatively establishes that the charges fail as a matter of 
law,—7 we are required to dismiss them as we are powerless to 
find a violation of the Act which does not exist on the record 
before us. 
The Association, PBA, AFSCME and PCTEA have not offered any 
facts which would warrant a contrary conclusion. Indeed, while 
they request that the cases be remanded and a hearing held to 
take evidence in support of the contentions raised in their 
supplemental briefs that the City's Mayor and the District's 
-
7While the District's March 6, 1995 memorandum to employees 
mentions that the Board of Education will adopt a policy at its 
April 12, 1995 meeting, the charge against the District makes no 
mention of such Board policy or its terms. In any event, the 
promulgation of a Board of Education resolution, by itself and 
without evidence of executive implementation in the employment 
context, would not violate the District's duty to negotiate. 
Odessa-Montour Cent.Sen. Dist. v. PERBf supra note 7. The 
Superintendent's statement in the memo that the fine was $1000, 
not a maximum of $500 per day as set forth in the legislation, 
does not render the memorandum evidence of a separate enactment 
or adoption of the ban by the Superintendent. 
—
7If the record had shown that the chief executive officer of 
either the City or the District, or any executive branch agent 
thereof, had sought the legislation, participated in the 
legislative process leading to enactment or otherwise adopted the 
legislation, then a cause of action under §209-a.l(d) might have 
been stated. 
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Superintendent in fact adopted and implemented the smoking ban, 
there is no indication that they have any evidence to offer that 
was not available at the time they agreed to the stipulation of 
facts in these cases. That our decision in these cases is based 
on a legal theory not raised by the parties does not entitle them 
to a hearing to introduce evidence which is not newly 
discovered.—7 
Because of our finding, we do not reach the exception filed 
by the respondents concerning the negotiability of the smoking 
ban. We, therefore, express no opinion on the merits of a charge 
directed to the respondents' implementation of an employer-
created and enforced smoking ban. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is 
reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kirisella7 Chairperson 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Membef 
Joseph Farneti, Member-^7 
^Margolin v. Newman. 130 A.D. 2d 312, 20 PERB f7018 (3d Dep't 
1987), appeal dismissed. 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB f7005 (1988); 
Town of Greece, 26 PERB f3004 (1993); and Civil Service Employees 
Ass'n. Inc. (Reese^. 25 PERB f3012 (1992). 
•^Member Farneti did not participate. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PULTON FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, CASE NO. PR-058 
LOCAL 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Upon a Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
BLITMAN & KING (CHARLES E. BLITMAN of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (ELAYNE C. GOLD of 
counsel), for City of Fulton 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Fulton 
Firefighters Association, Local 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO (FFA) to a 
decision by the Acting Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Acting Director). The Acting Director 
dismissed as deficient a declaratory ruling petition filed by the 
FFA by which FFA seeks a determination regarding the 
negotiability of two demands the City of Fulton (City) had raised 
in response to FFA's March 1996 petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration. In negotiations and in its response to the 
arbitration petition, the City had proposed to replace a 
management rights clause appearing in the parties7 expired 
collective bargaining agreement with another, differently worded 
version and to eliminate a minimum shifts clause. Although the 
City had filed an improper practice charge regarding certain of 
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FFA's proposals as submitted in its arbitration petition,-7 the 
FFA did not file an objection to any of the City's proposals as 
raised in its response to the petition for interest arbitration 
until it filed this petition. 
Notwithstanding the pendency of FFA's petition for interest 
arbitration, the parties agreed to meet in an effort to reach a 
contract. Meetings were held on June 27 and 28, 1996, but the 
parties did not reach an agreement. On July 1, 1996, the FFA 
filed an amended petition for interest arbitration. The City has 
not responded to that amended petition. On July 18, 1996, FFA 
filed this petition for a declaratory ruling regarding the City's 
management rights and minimum shifts proposals. 
FFA argues that its declaratory ruling petition was properly 
and timely filed pursuant to Part 210 of the Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) and that processing the petition pursuant to that part of 
the Rules is in the public interest and furthers the policies of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The City argues in response to FFA's exceptions that the 
Acting Director's decision is correct and should be affirmed 
because any other decision would "ignore . . . clearly 
-'On November 13,1996, an Administrative Law Judge issued a 
decision on the City's charge (Fulton Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 
3063. 29 PERB f4651). One of FFA's proposals was held a 
mandatory subject of negotiation as originally proposed. Two 
others were held mandatory as amended. As the amended proposals 
had not been negotiated, the ALJ ordered the amended demands 
withdrawn from arbitration. 
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articulated rules [and] would fly in the face of the entire 
spirit and intent of the Taylor Law". 
Having considered the parties7 arguments, we affirm the 
Acting Director's decision. 
Part 210 is the part of our Rules generally covering 
petitions for declaratory rulings which may be sought "with 
respect to the scope of negotiations" under the Act without any 
specified time restrictions. Part 210 was added on May 8, 1987. 
Effective that same date, §205.6 (a) of the Rules was amended and 
a new subsection (c) was added to permit an objection to 
arbitrability to be raised not only by an improper practice 
charge but also by a declaratory ruling petition, but only if it 
were filed within ten working days after the receipt of the 
petition for interest arbitration or the response thereto. 
Two points are clear from the history and development of the 
cited Rules. The first is that declaratory ruling petitions have 
application and purpose apart from the interest arbitration 
context. The second is that although a declaratory ruling 
petition is a proper mechanism for raising an objection to 
arbitrability, if used for that purpose or to that effect, the 
filing must satisfy the specific requirements of Rules §205.6, 
not the general requirements of Part 210. 
In this case, it is clear from FFA's papers that it is using 
the declaratory ruling petition to raise an objection to 
arbitrability, the goal being to prevent the City's two proposals 
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from being considered by an interest arbitration panel. For 
example, in describing its petition, FFA states that it is 
seeking a declaration as to whether the City's two demands are 
"non-mandatory and thus not arbitrable." (emphasis added) In the 
petition itself, FFA urges that we "prevent the City's efforts to 
place before a compulsory interest arbitration panel issues which 
. . . are non-mandatory". These two statements clearly establish 
that FFA intends this declaratory ruling petition to be the 
procedural device by which it raises objections to the City's two 
demands for the purpose of preventing an arbitration panel from 
considering those demands on their merits. Although Part 210 may 
be broad enough to allow for a simple determination as to whether 
the City's demands are mandatorily negotiable, a processing under 
Part 210 would not result in any order requiring the City to 
withdraw those demands from arbitration or any order requiring 
the panel not to consider those demands. A ruling on a scope of 
negotiations having no effect upon the arbitration process is not 
what the FFA wants under this petition and we would distort the 
declared purpose of its declaratory ruling petition were we to 
issue such a limited scope ruling. 
The FFA argues, however, that we should process this 
petition under Part 210 and still prevent the arbitration of the 
two demands - if we hold them to be nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation - because there are special circumstances present. 
Those special circumstances consist of the fact that the parties 
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voluntarily resumed negotiations, apparently at FFA's request, 
after FFA had filed its petition for interest arbitration and the 
City had filed its response. FFA argues that in these 
circumstances its petition for a declaratory ruling did not arise 
from or because of the City's response to its petition for 
arbitration, which would trigger §205.6 of the Rules, but from 
the parties' subsequent negotiations, which triggers Part 210 of 
the Rules. We are not persuaded by this argument for several 
reasons. 
First, regardless of the reason for or source of its 
declaratory ruling petition, FFA's purpose, as previously noted, 
is to prevent the City from having the two demands in issue 
considered by an arbitration panel. Therefore, the more specific 
provisions of §205.6 of the Rules, including its time 
requirements, must control the general provisions of Part 210. 
As we held in County of Rockland.-7 timeliness of the petition 
is "an initial requirement for processing, which a petitioner 
must satisfy before any merits determination may be made." 
Even were we to consider FFA's policy arguments, we would 
not be persuaded to hold that this petition should be processed. 
The two demands in issue were raised in the City's response to 
FFA's petition for arbitration and those demands are unchanged 
since their submission. FFA could have objected to the 
arbitrability of those demands pursuant to §205.6 of the Rules. 
2/26 PERB f3071, at 3134 (1993). 
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According to FFA, it made a calculated decision not to raise an 
objection upon receipt of the City's response. That was its 
choice, one which was made in circumstances in which any matter 
in dispute could be the subject of further negotiations, either 
by agreement of the parties or by the order of the arbitration 
panel.-7 Nothing before us persuades us that there is a reason 
to release FFA from the consequences of its tactical decision 
when it knew or should have known that further negotiations were 
possible. 
Moreover, the negotiations between these parties were not of 
a type or to an effect that would warrant the result FFA seeks. 
By FFA7s own allegations, the City never offered to modify or 
withdraw the two proposals in issue. No agreement was reached on 
any issue. FFA argues, however, that simply because it offered 
to modify or withdraw certain of its arbitration proposals, it 
should be allowed to file a declaratory ruling petition for the 
purpose of preventing the arbitration of the City's demands. We 
fail to see how unaccepted offers of settlement exchanged during 
negotiations change the parties' position to the point of 
allowing one of them to file an otherwise time-barred petition 
for a declaratory ruling. Having failed to reach an agreement, 
the exact same impasse existing before the post-petition 
negotiations began still exists for resolution by the arbitration 
panel. 
5/Act, §209.4 (c) (iv) . 
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Finally, we believe that processing FFA's declaratory ruling 
petition for its declared purpose would be contrary to the 
policies of the Act and inconsistent with the public interest. 
The Act clearly encourages the voluntary resolution of disputes 
even after the invocation of any of the statutory impasse 
procedures. The willingness of parties to engage in good faith 
negotiations after a petition for compulsory interest arbitration 
has been filed would be severely compromised if those 
negotiations afforded either party a second right to object, 
whether by improper practice charge or declaratory ruling 
petition, to issues in dispute before an arbitration panel. 
To expedite completion of the statutory interest arbitration 
process, our rules allow parties only a very limited timeframe 
within which to raise objections to demands presented for 
resolution by an arbitration panel. Those rules have been 
strictly construed.^ Absent the most extreme and compelling of 
circumstances, which we frankly cannot envision, but do not wish 
to foreclose as a possibility, we should not alter that carefully 
structured scheme. Finding no such extraordinary circumstances 
here, FFA's petition must be dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Acting Director's 
decision dismissing the petition is affirmed and FFA's exceptions 
are denied. 
-''See, e.g. , County of Rocklandf supra note 2; Elmira Police 
Benevolent Ass'n. Inc.. 25 PERB f3072, aff'q 25 PERB f4568 
(1992). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
c fi. Eri  3. Schmertz, Member 
Joseph Farneti, Member-7 
5/Member Farneti did not participate. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF ONONDAGA COUNTY, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17193 
COUNTY OF ONONDAGA and ONONDAGA COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Respondents. 
COSTELLO, COONEY & FEARON, LLP (MICHAEL A. TREMONT of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JOHN A. GERBER, COUNTY ATTORNEY (LAWRENCE R. WILLIAMS of 
counsel), for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Deputy 
Sheriffs Benevolent Association of Onondaga County, Inc. (DSBA) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge that the County of Onondaga (County) and the Onondaga 
County Sheriff (Sheriff) (together, Employer) violated §§209-
a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it used employees in the unit represented by the Onondaga 
County Sheriff's Police Association (Association) to transport 
and supervise pretrial and presentence detainees from the County 
Justice Center to a local medical facility for treatment, work 
that DSBA claimed was exclusively the work of its unit. 
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Until April 1, 1994, employees in the Sheriff's Department 
in both the police and custody divisions were represented by the 
DSBA. On April 1, the Association became the exclusive 
bargaining representative for a unit of employees in the police 
division. The DSBA remained the representative of the employees 
in the custody division. At all times thereafter, the 1992-95 
collective bargaining agreement between the County and DSBA 
remained in effect and was also made applicable by agreement to 
the unit represented by the Association. That agreement contains 
the following management rights clause: 
Article IV 
County Management 
The Association agrees that the County of Onondaga 
and/or the County Legislature and the Sheriff, 
hereinafter known as the Employer, shall retain 
complete authority for the policies and administration 
of all County departments, offices or agencies which it 
exercises under the provisions of law and the 
Constitution of the State of New York and/or the United 
States of America and in fulfilling its rights and 
responsibilities under this agreement. Any matter 
involving the management of governmental operations 
vested by law in the Sheriff and not covered by this 
agreement is in the province of the Sheriff. 
The rights and responsibilities of the Employer 
include, but are not necessarily limited to the 
following: (1) to determine the standards of service 
to be offered by its offices, agencies and departments; 
(2) to direct, hire, promote, appraise, transfer, 
assign, retain employees and to suspend, demote, 
discharge or take disciplinary action against 
employees; (3) to relieve employees from duties because 
of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; (4) to 
maintain the efficiency of government operations 
entrusted to them; (5) to determine the methods, means 
and personnel by which such operations are to be 
conducted; (6) to take whatever actions may be 
necessary to carry out the mission, policies or purpose 
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of the department, office or agency concerned; (7) to 
establish any reasonable rules or regulations; (8) to 
establish specifications for each class of positions 
and to classify or reclassify and to allocate or 
reallocate new or existing positions. 
The Association further agrees that the provisions of 
this Article are not subject to grievance procedures as 
set forth herein unless in the exercise of said rights 
and responsibilities the Employer has violated a 
specific term or regulations of this agreement, 
(emphasis added) 
The ALJ determined that the transport of pretrial and 
presentence prisoners was and had been exclusively the work of 
the custody division employees who are represented by the DSBA. 
However, based upon our decision in County of Onondaga and 
Sheriff of the County of Onondaga (hereafter, County of 
Onondaga)-7, issued after the briefs had been received in this 
matter, the ALJ determined that the Employer was privileged to 
make the assignment to the police division employees who are 
represented by the Association and dismissed the charge. 
The DSBA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ 
erred in relying on County of Onondaga. The Employer supports 
the ALJ's decision insofar as he found a waiver, but excepts to 
the ALJ's conclusion that the work in issue was exclusively the 
work of members of DSBA's bargaining unit. 
For the reasons set forth in our decision in County of 
Onondaga., we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
^29 PERB 53046 (July 31, 1996). In that case, the County 
assigned duties previously performed by employees in the 
Association's unit to employees in the unit represented by DSBA. 
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In County of Onondaga, we found that the Employer had 
reserved the right, under the language of Article IV, to assign 
duties performed by any employees in the former overall unit to 
any of the job titles that were in that unit when this management 
rights clause was negotiated. The DSBA and the Association both 
agreed at the time they became the representatives for the new 
units that all the terms of the 1992-95 agreement between DSBA 
and the County, which included Article IV, would remain in 
effect. The Employer is, therefore, privileged to use employees 
in the unit represented by the Association to perform work which 
had been done previously by the deputy sheriff-jailers who are 
still represented by DSBA, even if they had performed that work 
exclusively. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the AKT 
and dismiss the DSBA's exceptions. Our decision makes it 
unnecessary to reach the Employer's cross-exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 1996, 1996 
Albany, New York 
e R.'Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
Joseph Farneti, Member' IT 
1/ Member Farneti did not participate. 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORCHARD PARK POLICE BENEVOLENT, 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17997 
TOWN OF ORCHARD PARK, 
Respondent. 
HARRIS, BEACH & WILCOX (LAWRENCE J. ANDOLINA of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Orchard 
Park Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (Association) to a 
decision of the Acting Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Acting Director) dismissing its charge that 
the Town of Orchard Park (Town) violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to 
incorporate the terms of an interest arbitration award into a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
The Association was notified by the Acting Director that the 
charge was deficient on both procedural and substantive grounds. 
The Association thereafter amended the charge. While the Acting 
Director found that the amendment had corrected the procedural 
deficiencies, he nonetheless dismissed the charge. The Acting 
Director found that the Association had only asserted that it had 
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been the parties7 practice in the past to incorporate the terms 
of an arbitration award into a collective bargaining agreement. 
No facts were alleged upon which a finding could be made that the 
Town had agreed to incorporate the terms of the particular 
interest arbitration award in issue into a collective bargaining 
agreement and there were likewise no facts alleged to evidence 
that the Town had failed to continue the terms of any expired 
agreement. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Acting 
Director erred both in determining that there was no evidence 
that the parties had agreed to incorporate the terms of the 
interest arbitration award into the collective bargaining 
agreement and in finding no evidence of the Town's failure to 
continue the terms of an expired agreement. The Town has not 
filed a response. 
Based upon our review of the record and a consideration of 
the Association's arguments, we affirm the decision of the Acting 
Director. 
In City of Niagara Falls-7, we held that, absent an 
agreement to do so, neither party to an impasse which is resolved 
by the issuance of an interest arbitration award has any 
statutory obligation to incorporate that award into a signed 
collective bargaining agreement because an award is not an 
23 PERB ^3039 (1990) . 
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agreement for purposes of the Act.2/ Here, the Association 
asserts that the Town has agreed in previous years to incorporate 
the terms of interest arbitration awards into collective 
bargaining agreements. Such a practice, even if established, 
does not evidence the Town's agreement to incorporate the terms 
of the 1995 interest arbitration award into a collective 
bargaining agreement. Without an agreement to do so, the Town 
had no obligation under the Act to execute an agreement 
containing the terms of that interest arbitration award.-7 
Although the Association argues to the contrary, the arbitration 
panel's suggestion that certain terms of the interest arbitration 
award "should" be included in a new agreement does not establish 
the requisite consent by the Town to do so. 
The Association also argues that the Town's refusal to 
incorporate the terms of the interest arbitration award into a 
collective bargaining agreement is a violation of §209-a.l(e) of 
the Act because "any negotiations that take place on a new 
collective bargaining agreement will not be based on the terms of 
the expired agreement, which the [Association] considers the 
Interest Arbitration Award." Section 209-a.l(e) simply requires 
a public employer to continue the terms of an expired collective 
bargaining agreement until a new one is reached unless the union 
which is a party to that agreement has violated the no-strike 
-'This does not mean, however, that an interest arbitration award 
is not binding and enforceable. 
^County of Suffolk, 12 PERB f3014 (1979). 
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provisions of the Act. The Association's assertion that 
§209-a.l(e) confers a right to the incorporation of the terms of 
an interest arbitration award into a collective bargaining 
agreement has no basis in fact or legislative history. While 
parties may agree to do so, as we held in Niagara Falls, supra, 
the Association has presented no evidence here that these parties 
so agreed. 
The Association's exceptions are denied and the Acting 
Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 1996 
Albany, New York 
&£^CkM J*. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric JT Schmertz, Member 
Joseph Farneti, Member^ 
-'Member Farneti did not participate. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
New Hartford (Town) to a decision by the Acting Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Acting Director) issued 
pursuant to a unit clarification/placement petition filed by 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union 182 
(Local). The Local is seeking by its petition to represent the 
positions of account clerk and receptionist/data entry within its 
existing blue-collar highway department unit consisting of twenty-
two employees. 
A conference was held on June 29, 1996, at which the Local 
was represented by John P. Amodio, its vice-president and business 
agent, and the Town was represented by its attorney of record at 
the time, John C. Scholl. The Town's highway superintendent, 
John S. Topor, was also in attendance. At the conference, the 
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Acting Director ascertained that the Town did not oppose the 
petition,i7 that the employees in the two positions in issue 
worked only in the highway department, and that they had the same 
supervisors and some of the same duties as the blue-collar 
employees in the existing unit. The Acting Director summarized 
those facts in a letter and informed the parties' representatives 
that a decision would issue on the basis of his letter unless 
notified to the contrary by August 7, 1996.2/ 
By decision dated August 26, 1996, the Acting Director placed 
the two titles into the Local's existing unit. The petition was 
granted because "the Town does not oppose the petition" and 
because "the facts support such a finding". The facts recited 
were that "the employees in the two positions work with and under 
the same supervision as, and perform some of the same functions as 
unit employees". 
Through new counsel, the Town claims in these exceptions that 
Scholl's failure to object to the petition is not binding upon the 
Town because his actions were not authorized by the Town and were 
actually contrary to the instructions given him. Similarly, the 
Town argues that Topor's willingness to include the two titles 
within the Local's unit cannot bind the Town. Moreover, the Town 
argues that the Acting Director's decision rests improperly on a 
-^ Topor had on February 1, 1996, written Amodio to inform him 
that the "Town of New Hartford" had no objection to the inclusion 
of the two titles in issue into the Local's existing unit. 
^The representatives had waived the filing of any memoranda. 
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stipulation obtained from Amodio, who is not an attorney.2/ 
Finally, the Town argues that the Acting Director's decision is 
based on mistakes of fact about the positions in issue. According 
to the Town, neither of these two white collar employees shares 
any community of interest with the blue-collar employees in the 
Local's existing unit and, moreover, the account clerk is 
confidential and not entitled to any representation in any unit. 
The Local argues in response that it is "incredible" to 
believe that Scholl was acting outside the scope of his authority. 
Therefore, the Local argues that the Town's failure to object to 
the petition should not be excused. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Acting Director's decision. 
The Town's exceptions contest the appropriateness of the 
Acting Director's unit determination. Throughout the entirety of 
the proceedings before the Acting Director, the Town affirmatively 
represented that it did not oppose the very placement the Acting 
Director ordered. Although there is a question about the 
appropriateness of the placement ordered because it creates a 
mixed unit of white-collar and blue-collar employees,-7 we are 
^In Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB. 168 Misc. 2d 284, 
29 PERB 17004 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co., 1996), the Supreme Court held 
that certain appearances before PERB constitute the practice of 
law such that, upon objection, only an attorney could act as a 
party representative. That decision was recently reversed on 
appeal. A.D.2d , 29 PERB f7020 (3d Dep't Nov. 7, 1996). 
-'See Town of Ramapo, 8 PERB J[3057 (1975) ; Town of Smithtown, 
8 PERB 53015 (1975). 
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empowered to review the appropriateness of the unit in this 
context-7 only if that question is properly before us under these 
exceptions. For example, if these exceptions had been untimely 
filed, we could not reach an issue regarding the appropriateness 
of the unit. Therefore, we must first decide whether the Town 
should be permitted to contest before us an issue it did not 
contest below. We hold that a compelling interest in the finality 
of our proceedings and labor relations stability forecloses such 
review. 
The Town could have and should have challenged the 
appropriateness of the Local's proposed unit placement if it 
wished to do so by a response filed pursuant to §201.5(d) of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules) and at the conference. Indeed, that 
section of our Rules requires such a response, which was not 
filed. The Town, instead, affirmatively represented more than 
once and through more than one agent that it did not oppose the 
petition. 
The Town now argues through different counsel that we should 
entertain this new issue because its agents' actions in stating 
that the Town did not oppose the petition were not authorized. To 
consider this appeal for that reason, however, would open all of 
^The appropriateness of the unit would necessarily be before us 
if we were being asked to issue a certification and bargaining 
order. 
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our proceedings to exceptions upon grounds never raised below.& 
Finality would be jeopardized, for any party with an arguable 
excuse would have an opportunity to convince us that it should be 
allowed to litigate an issue or issues it did not raise 
previously. The resolution of whatever statutory questions were 
before us would be substantially delayed while we litigated an 
issue - here the scope and exercise of Scholl's and Topor's 
authority - having nothing whatever to do with the question 
submitted under the Act for our determination. The resulting 
delay and labor relations instability is clearly contrary to the 
policies of the Act. 
Any issues arising from the Town's relationship with its 
agents Scholl and Topor are issues for resolution in the 
appropriate forums. Those relationships cannot, however, permit 
the Town to raise, to us on appeal a nonjurisdictional issue never 
raised even indirectly at any prior time. Without foreclosing a 
possibility that there might be some circumstances so compelling 
as to warrant a remand for investigation or hearing of issues not 
raised below, we hold that the circumstances alleged here do not 
warrant that result. 
-'In contrast to the nature of the issue raised here, 
jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time because those 
issues involve our very power to hear and decide a case. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are 
denied.-7 As there is no issue properly before us concerning the 
appropriateness of the unit placement ordered, the Acting 
Director's decision must be affirmed. 
DATED: December 18, 1996 
Albany, New York 
KA —-^  llXi<x<aJ 
Pa'uline R. Kirfsella,' Chairperson 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
Joseph Farneti, Member27 
^The Town's claim that the account clerk is confidential can be 
raised by the Town in an application filed pursuant to §201.10 of 
the Rules. 
^Member Farneti did not participate. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Robert DiMeo to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). DiMeo alleges 
in his charge that Local 1359, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (DC 37) breached its duty of fair representation in violation 
of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act 
(Act): 
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We reach the merits of DiMeo's arguments as the exceptions 
are in a form substantially in compliance with our Rules. 
The first two allegations were dismissed by the ALJ upon 
findings of fact resting on credibility resolutions. Nothing in 
the record or DiMeo's exceptions warrants a reversal of those 
credibility determinations. 
DiMeo's exceptions to the dismissal of the third numbered 
allegation rest on the mistaken assumption that a bargaining 
agent is duty bound under the Act to refrain from doing or saying 
anything which a grievant might consider to be detrimental to his 
or her personal interests. A bargaining agent, however, has 
duties running to the negotiating unit as a whole and to the 
collective bargaining agreement covering that unit. In this 
case, DC 37 advanced to the State's grievance representative the 
union position that determinations in all out-of-title work 
grievances must be based only on the duties actually performed by 
an employee and that is why it told the State's representative 
that signing as a "processing attorney" was not relevant. That 
is a position which is certainly not unreasonable on its face and 
one the ALJ found upon a credibility resolution to have been 
taken in good faith. Nothing in the record evidences that DC 37 
had ever taken a contrary position and nothing evidences that 
DC 37 promised in the settlement of the earlier improper practice 
charge not to disagree with any of the arguments DiMeo might make 
at the step 3 grievance meeting. There is, therefore, nothing in 
the simple disagreement between DC 37 and DiMeo about the 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
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CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
